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THE LESSONS OF AIRLINE REGULATION AND
DEREGULATION: WILL WE MAKE THE SAME
MISTAKES IN SPACE?
DAVID G. MONK
I. INTRODUCTION: EXPANDING SPACE USE
W ITH EACH passing year, man pushes further and
further into space - the "final frontier." What was
merely science fiction just decades ago has become reality
in many respects, and ideas that used to exist only in the
minds of the world's true dreamers are now becoming
workable plans on computers and blueprints.
The numerous uses man will be able to make of outer
space will require new and innovative transportation
methods and governance systems. For example, future
energy sources may be space-based, requiring frequent
traffic between the moon, space, and Earth for building
and maintaining the system.' Potential mining opportuni-
ties exist on the moon and other planets which may even-
tually become cost-effective,2  and production of
pharmaceutical and other products in space will give rise
to new industries and transportation needs. The space
' 300 Billion Watts, 24 Hours a Day, AIR & SPACE/SMITHSONIAN, June-July 1990,
at 68, 70-75.
The vast array of minerals on the moon and other planets offer a possibility of
great value to those who would be able to mine the ore and transport it back to
Earth. Obviously, at this point in time, the costs of conducting such an operation
greatly outweigh the benefits. As space transportation and technology expand,
however, the costs inherent in mining and transporting the material will fall, per-
haps to the point where the benefits outweigh the costs.
A number of experiments on the development of pharmaceuticals have been
made on Space Shuttle missions. Indications are that the gravity-free, ultra-clean
environment of space will allow the manufacture of many higher-quality products.
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shuttle program in the United States and the successful
space station efforts of the Soviet Union indicate that reg-
ular space travel and permanent habitation in outer space
will be possible in the near future.4 Colonization of Mars
is closer than one might think,5 and while space use for
telecommunication purposes now affects everyday life as
satellite technology increases, maintenance trips will be-
come more common and economical relative to placing
another satellite into orbit.6
In August 1989, Congress' Office of Technology As-
sessment (OTA) released a report calling for a realistic
appraisal of what it will take to reach the United States
4 ANDREW S. YOUNG, LAW AND POLICY IN THE SPACE STATIONS' ERA 3-4 (1989).
A space station as envisioned by former NASA Administrator James M. Beggs
could function as:
-a laboratory in space, for the conduct of science and development
of new technologies;
-a permanent observatory, to look down upon the Earth and out at
the universe;
-a transportation node where payloads and vehicles are stationed,
processed and propelled to their destinations;
-a servicing facility, where these payloads and vehicles are main-
tained and if necessary repaired;
-an assembly facility where, due to ample time on orbit and the pres-
ence of appropriate equipment, large structures are put together
and checked out;
-a manufacturing facility where human intelligence and the servicing
capability of the station combine to enhance commercial opportuni-
ties in space; and
-a storage depot where payloads and parts are kept on orbit for sub-
sequent deployment.
Id. (citing Civil Space Station:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and
Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 43 (1983)).
Additionally, the space station has been considered to serve as "a staging base
for possible future missions, such as a permanent lunar base, manned mission to
Mars, a manned survey of the asteroids, a manned scientific and communications
facility in geosynchronous orbit, or unmanned planetary probes." Id. at 4.
Robert Zubrin & David Baker, Humans to Mars in 1999, AEROSPACE AM., Au-
gust 1990, at 30.
'i The recent difficulty with the Hubble Space Telescope is a good example of a
situation where the costs of sending a maintenance mission to remedy the techni-
cal difficulties would be considerably less than manufacturing and deploying an
entirely new satellite. With highly technical and innovative hardware, malfunc-
tions are sure to arise in future satellite deployments as well. Regular space traffic
will eventually be required for service and maintenance missions.
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government's goals for space usage. In discussing the
expansion of human presence in space, the report men-
tioned the need for shuttle improvements, advanced
manned rockets, an unmanned "Shuttle C" and an ad-
vanced launch system. Additionally, the report discussed
the development of a National Aerospace Plane8 and
space station escape and rescue vehicles. Beyond the call
for this exotic hardware, the report also recognized the
potential for increased international cooperation in the
development and use of space. 9
President Bush has received considerable praise from
industry leaders for giving new (or at least renewed) di-
rection to the aerospace industry through the recently-
formed National Space Council (NSC).' 0 Bush is also urg-
ing another Moon mission by the year 2010 and a Mars
mission by 2019. Some government leaders have ex-
pressed hope for international participation to bring fru-
7 Richard DeMeis, Shuttling to the Space Station, AEROSPACE AM., March 1990, at
44.
8 The aerospace plane is a vehicle which takes off and lands like an airplane but
has the capacity to escape Earth's atmosphere and function as a spacecraft. See
Craig Covault, Aero-Space Plane Leading U.S. Hypersonic Research, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Feb. 27, 1989, at 18; Le Bourget, Soviets Seek Cooperative Role in Western Hy-
personic Programs, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 19, 1989, at 38; see also Stephen
Gorove, Legal and Policy Issues of the Aerospace Plane, 16J. SPACE L. 147 (1988) (dis-
cussing the incredible potential of the aerospace plane).
11 DeMeis, supra note 7, at 44 (discussing international cooperation in the use of
foreign manned launchers).
- Cort Durocher, Commentary: A National Space Policy for the 21st Century, AERO-
SPACE Am., Feb. 1990, at 5. The NSC is chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle
who recently announced the council's five-point strategy for the American space
program, namely: (1) build a launch infrastructure that will ensure reliable, afford-
able, and routine access to space; (2) open the frontiers of space with manned and
unmanned programs; (3) work to solve problems on Earth through scientific use
of space; (4) use space to increase the nation's economic well-being, create jobs,
and boost the economy; and (5) ensure freedom of action in space to support our
national defense. Id.
These goals set forth by the U.S. government are, without doubt, reflections of
this nation's own best interests. Whether these interests are consistent with goals
of other nations will determine the likelihood of global cooperation on any mean-
ingful scale. For a discussion of cooperative efforts in space exploration and use
and possible effect on future space governance, see infra notes 144-152 and accom-
panying text.
I Aerospace Spotlight, AEROSPACE AM., June 1990, at 1.
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ition to these and other missions.' 2 This desire for global
cooperation is evidenced by a number of international ef-
forts in space, including plans for future space use.'
3
Scientists from several nations are now working together
toward breakthroughs which will lower the cost of space
travel, thus hastening the utilization and commercializa-
tion of space. 14
As the heavens begin to crowd with commercial and
governmental space traffic, however, international coop-
eration will become increasingly important and more diffi-
cult to achieve.' 5 Eventually, space transport will require
more comprehensive regulation at both the domestic and
international levels. Surely, experience with regulation
and deregulation of the airline industry in the United
States and its international consequences offers a base
which can make international cooperation in the coming
"spaceline" industry a more realistic goal. Broad, high-
minded ideals have their place in plans for the future, but
the nuts and bolts of space regulation should come from
the lessons of previous experience in regulating air
transport. 16
Because the area of space law is so new, especially re-
21 Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee recently expressed U.S. interest in secur-
ing international participation in these missions. Id. Most likely, Senator Gore's
views are at least partially motivated by a desire to offset some of the costs of such
missions.
, See Aerospace Spotlight, AEROSPACE AM., Aug. 1990, at 1. The NSC recently
approved plans for launching a U.S. satellite by a Soviet rocket from a spaceport
in Australia. Id.
14 Gleb E. Lotzino-Lozinsky & Vladimir P. Plokhikh, Reusable Space Systems and
International Cooperation, AEROSPACE AM., June 1990, at 36 (describing the USSR's
efforts to lower costs through research and development of future reusable space
vehicles and calling for international cooperation in the effort).
I, See infra notes 144-153 and accompanying text for a discussion of coopera-
tion in space exploration and use.
- Some commentators have been inclined to question whether there really is a
distinct creature called "Aviation Law." See George N. Tompkins & Rod D.
Margo, Space Law - Fact or Myth, J. AIR L. & CoM. Perhaps aviation law is just a
specialized application of already existing "earthbound" legal principles. Id.
"Space Law" is similar to "Aviation Law" in that it involves the application of
concepts of existing law in highly specialized circumstances. This similarity offers
a paradigm to consider in developing space law.
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garding space transport, the industry is starting with a
more perfect world than that found in the pure aviation
environment. As a result, opportunities exist to make the
right choices from the start. The purpose of this com-
ment is to discuss some of the mistakes that have been
made in the course of regulating and deregulating the air-
line industry in an effort to glean lessons that will be help-
ful as the course for regulating the space transport
industry begins.
II. THE HISTORY AND LESSONS OF AIRLINE REGULATION
AND DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
This section will discuss some of the leading problems
the United States is facing after a decade of experience
with a deregulated air transport industry. In order to un-
derstand the lessons of airline deregulation, one must un-
derstand the reasons the airline industry was regulated to
begin with and the forces that precipitated the move to-
ward a deregulated system.
A. The History of Airline Regulation and Deregulation
Initially, the transportation industry was unregulated,
but because of market failure resulting in destructive com-
petition and outright monopoly or oligopoly, the govern-
ment developed comprehensive regulation.' 7 Congress
originally established airline regulation during the De-
pression to remedy the dismal economic condition of the
industry at that time and to avoid the problems of unre-
strained competition seen earlier in the rail and motor
carrier industries. 18 Congress created the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board to regulate the industry. 19
Congress recognized the great role the airline industry
17 See, e.g., Paul S. Dempsey, Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire Mythology. Eco-
nomic Theory in Turbulence, 56J. AIR L. & CoM. 305, 310-11 (1990).
1" Id. at 311; see also Paul S. Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics
Board - Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 95 (1979).
11, Civil Aeronautics Act, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (codified at 49 U.S.C
§§ 1301-1542 (1988)).
7191992]
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could play in the growth and development of the nation.
During the Great Depression, however, the economic
condition of the industry was very weak. Congress viewed
the airline industry as similar to a public utility (much like
railroads and motor carriers) and proceeded to develop
regulations mirroring those it had recently imposed upon
the other transportation industries. 20 The focus was to
avoid encountering the painful impact of cut-throat,
wasteful, and unrestrained competition and the economic
chaos which had previously plagued the rail and motor
carrier industries.2' In 1938 Congress passed the Civil
Aeronautics Act,22 creating the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) - originally called the Civil Aeronautics Author-
ity23 - a regulatory agency modeled after the Interstate
Commerce Commission.24
The winds of deregulation began howling in the 1960s
and 1970s with criticism of economic regulation and its
apparent evils. Pricing and entry restrictions gave con-
sumers excessive service, insufficient price competition,
and inflated airline costs while denying the industry suffi-
cient profits. 5 Senate subcommittee reports posited that
deregulation "would allow pricing flexibility which would
stimulate new and innovative offerings, allow passengers
the range of price and service options dictated by con-
sumer demand, enhance carrier productivity and effi-
ciency, increase industry health, and result in a superior
allocation of society's resources. ' ' 26 Leaders of the dereg-
ulation movement such as Alfred Kahn 27 accused regula-
20 PAUL S. DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULA-
TION: THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION 18 (1989).
21 Id. at 18.
22 Id.
. Id. at 18, 25.
24 Id. at 18.
2.1 Dempsey, supra note 17, at 312.
26 Id. at 312-13 (citing Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., ist Sess. 3 (1975)).
27 Alfred Kahn, former Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),
strongly advocated deregulation of the airline industry.
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tion of causing higher air fares than would have existed
otherwise, misallocating resources, encouraging carrier
inefficiency, denying customers the desired range of
price/service options, and creating tendencies toward ex-
cess capacity. 28
As a result of these sentiments pervading the market-
place of ideas and strong advocates in both the Carter and
Reagan Administrations, Congress passed legislation in
the late 1970s intending to substantially deregulate much
of the transportation industry.29 The resulting airline de-
regulation proved more comprehensive than that of the
other transportation sectors, and began with passage of
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (1978 Act).30
Beginning with the passage of the 1978 Act, deregula-
tion proponents argued that once governmental restraints
were lifted from the competitors in the airline industry,
natural market economies would take over and create a
more ideal environment. Regarding these market forces,
many supporters argued that no economies of scale 3' ex-
ist in the airline industry. Thus, enough competitors and
few mergers would ensure competitive pricing if the mar-
ket were allowed to function freely. 2 Those who were
less confident in studies supporting the absence of econo-
mies of scale 33 advocated that even if a monopoly or oli-
gopoly resulted from deregulation, the threat of new
' Dempsey, supra note 17, at 312-13.
2 ' Id. at 312-14.
-" Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
-' Economies of scale exist when a company's increases in total production
draw unit costs down. As the operation's scale grows, the company becomes
more efficient. In regard to the airline industry, economies of scale would exist if
by increasing the number of airplanes, terminals, and/or routes, an airline com-
pany could lower its costs per passenger. If economies of scale exist in the airline
industry, airlines, in an attempt to lower costs, would grow larger and larger to
take advantage of these savings, thus squeezing out smaller, higher-cost competi-
tors. If no economies of scale exist, smaller competitors would be able to effec-
tively compete with their larger counterparts.
'2 This is known as the "traditionalist" view, and was held by many of those in
charge of airline regulation in the 1970s. Dempsey, supra note 17, at 314-15.
1:1 Several academic studies indicated there were no economies of scale in the
airline industry. See id. at 315.
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entrants would force a natural monopolist to price at cost.
This "contestability" argument 34 had 3 basic assumptions:
(1) there are no absolute cost advantages for an incum-
bent (that is, all competitors have equal access to technol-
ogy); (2) there are no entry or exit costs (i.e. sunk costs)
with respect to a particular market; and (3) consumers re-
spond to price reductions by new entrants quicker than
incumbents can match the lower price. 5
Thus, the supporters also based their endorsement of
deregulation on the premises that destructive competition
was unlikely to develop in the industry and that the ease
of entry of new market participants would "discipline"
pricing. With the advantage of hindsight, commentators
today are quick to claim that all of these assumptions have
proven to be false. 6
Even leading deregulation proponents have conceded
that they were wrong regarding the absence of economies
of scale in the airline industry.3 7 The resultant reconcen-
tration through mergers and failures and absence of new
entrants means there is little downward pressure on pric-
ing. A decade of deregulation "has brought about cut-
throat pricing, a miserable level of industry profitability,
insufficient capital to re-equip its aging fleet, and a deteri-
oration of service. "38
- This viewpoint is called the "contestability argument" because it presents the
theory that competitors would enter markets in which prices were too high and
"contest" the existing market participants, even natural monopolists, thus driving
prices down to an optimal level. Id. at 317.
- Id.
- Id. at 307.
.7 Id. at 319.
Id. at 322 (emphasis in original). One leading author on the effects of this
movement on the transportation industry asserts that "deregulation has caused
unprecedented levels of concentration, discriminatory pricing, service deteriora-
tion and narrower safety margins." Id. at 308. Specifically, after ten years of
deregulation:
(1) concentration of national and regional market power is greater;
(2) routes are more circuitous;
(3) service is poorer;
(4) labor-management relations have deteriorated; and,
(5) air travel is less safe
Id. at 306; c.f, Alfred E. Kahn Airline Deregulation-A Mixed Bag, But a Clear Success
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Promises of lower ticket prices have not been met in the
long run. After adjustment for inflation and fuel price
changes, ticket prices are at least 2.6% higher than before
deregulation.3 9 Increased route circuity has resulted in
more inconvenience and lower productivity. 40 Despite
early indications that deregulation would increase compe-
tition and drive down prices, the emergence of "fortress
hubs," dominated by monopolistic and oligopolistic pow-
ers, built and solidified formidable barriers to new market
entrants .41
What does all of this mean to us as we consider a course
for space regulation? That depends first upon whether
we have really learned anything from our experience with
airline regulation and deregulation. If we have learned
any lessons, the question becomes whether application of
those lessons will be at all valuable in our own hypotheti-
cal construction of a spaceline governance system. Most
of the answer to the latter issue involves additional appli-
cation of current international and space law as well as
some hypotheses on our ability as a world community to
cooperate in achieving common goals.4 2 While the regu-
lation and deregulation of the American skies is not a per-
fect paradigm for developing space regulation, failure to
learn from the "mistakes" of that experience would cer-
tainly be a waste. The following is a discussion of some
possible lessons.
B. Lessons in Economic and Practical Efficiency: Fallout from
Mergers, Monopolies, and Hubbing
The problem with the great expectations of deregula-
tion is that, in general, the transportation industry is not
the ideal model of perfect competition, as significant
Nevertheless, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 229 (1988); Aired E. Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregula-
tion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 316 (1988).
- Dempsey, supra note 17, at 308-09.
44, Id.
4, Id. at 333-34.
42 See infra notes 139-175 and accompanying text.
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economies of scale and scope exist.43 After a brief, sub-
stantial increase in the number of carriers,44 more than
200 carriers have gone bankrupt or have been acquired
through mergers. 45 After many bankruptcies and merg-
ers, the number of competitors has dropped off dramati-
cally and oligopolies now exist. Thus, several carriers are
now able to exert great market power and, even monopo-
listic power in some areas. The natural result of this mar-
ket power has been borne out empirically: prices have
risen for many consumers, and the level of service has de-
teriorated. From a policy standpoint, these facts are quite
disturbing. On a macroeconomic level, excessive wealth
has been transferred from consumers to producers. As
such, society's resources are being misallocated while
consumers purchase alternative products or services
which are more costly for society to produce.46
The transportation industry has a built-in vulnerability
to both price wars and excess capacity. Transportation
firms sell what is basically an instantly perishable com-
modity. As soon as an aircraft taxis down the runway (or a
spacecraft takes off), the value of any unused capacity is
lost forever. Distress-sale pricing is thus used to fill seats
during periods when demand is weak or when excess ca-
pacity exists due to unlimited entry.47 As a result of this
destructive competition, airlines seek out or create mo-
nopoly market opportunities so they can increase prices
offsetting fixed costs (and hopefully show a profit).48 The
results of this phenomenon are now also beginning to
43 DEMPSEY, supra note 20, at 76. Dempsey further argues that economies of
scale exist in the space transport industry.
44 Dempsey, supra note 17, at 323.
4. Id.
M, DEMPSEY, supra note 20, at 76.
47 Dempsey, supra note 17, at 324.
48 Id. A U.S. Department of Transportation study released in 1990 found that
when a single airline commanded 75% or more of the traffic at an airport, passen-
ger fares were 18.7% higher than otherwise. Monica Luebker, Comment, The
1992 European Unification: Effects in the Air Transport Industry, 56 J. AIR L. & COM.
589, 621 (1990) (citing Will Europe's Crowded Airports Strangle Competition at Birth?,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 1990, at 69).
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show on the international level. With the globalization of
air transport, the potential looms for the creation of inter-
national megacarriers exercising incredible monopolistic
power. 49 By the year 2000, some analysts predict there
could be as few as nine or ten global megacarriers.5 °
The nature of the transportation industry is such that a
local monopoly can cause greater harm than in other in-
dustries because transportation is a basic part of the soci-
ety's social and economic infrastructure. The quality of
that system affects the efficiency of all other business ac-
tivities in the community and the quality of life of its resi-
dents. A community's ability to retain existing industries,
and attract new ones, is especially dependent upon the
adequacy, convenience, and reasonable pricing of its air-
line service. 5' Presumably, a city's proximity to and qual-
ity of space transportation will have these same effects.
Thus, if monopolies are not necessary in the future space
transport industry, and private competition at some level
is seen as desirable, some method of avoiding excess ca-
pacity and deleterious price wars must be implemented.
Competition incited by deregulation has lowered prices
for some passengers, but many people are unable to take
advantage of the discounts, and substantial price discrimi-
nation has emerged.5 2 With the increased concentration
through bankruptcy and mergers, even the beneficiaries
of discriminatorily lower prices may soon be paying
higher fares. Alfred Kahn admits that consideration of
price ceilings in single-carrier markets may be in order.53
4 Dempsey, supra note 17, at 328.
-so See William Stockton, When Eight Carriers Call the Shots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
1988 § 3, at 1.
-11 Dempsey, supra note 17, at 388; see also, Melvin A. Brenner, Airline Deregulation
- A Case Study in Public Policy Failure, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 179, 189 (1988).
. Passengers with flexible schedules who travel between major airline points of
service have enjoyed discount fares while those who travel to and from low-traffic
points or must make last-minute flight arrangements pay considerably higher
rates. Price discrimination, therefore, exists in single-carrier markets and hurts
passengers who travel on business or must make immediate, unexpected flights
for funerals or other emergencies. Dempsey, supra note 17, at 345-46.
.- Id. at 347.
1992] 725
726 JOURNAL OF AIR L1A WAND COMMERCE [57
Basically, passengers traveling between dense traffic
points pay relatively lower fares than those utilizing less-
traveled routes. Small town passengers are, therefore,
subsidizing the competitive losses of big-town routes.54
If the low or non-profitable routes are to be maintained,
someone must pay for them. Such costs may be borne by
(1) the small route passengers paying higher fares; (2) the
government subsidizing the costs of the route in order to
keep it available; or (3) the airline themselves, absorbing
the cost as mandated by regulation and charging higher
fares on other, more profitable routes to make up the
difference.
Pricing will be different for space travel because the
costs incurred in reaching space orbit will require that de-
parture and destination points on Earth be located exclu-
sively in large hubs.55 Even when the aerospace plane
56
becomes a common means of transportation, with resul-
tant decreases in noise and large area requirements (for
safety and nuisance reasons)., only the long-distance
routes, whether between two points on earth or from
earth-to-space, will utilize spacecraft. Travel to and from
hubs offering space transport service will be much
cheaper by other transportation means. Costs will be sub-
stantial, at least for the foreseeable technological future,
to escape the atmosphere, but once in orbit, the space sta-
tions will function as hubs themselves. Outside Earth's at-
mosphere the airline industry should analogize closely
with intraspace transport.57
In the airline industry, "hub and spoking" developed in
response to the forces set in motion by deregulation.
.4 id. at 347-48.
. Approximately twelve launch sites in the world today are capable of de-
ploying an orbital craft.
. See supra note 8 for a discussion of the aerospace plane.
-.7 According to a NASA spokesman, space travel will one day be largely space-
based. Many spacecraft will be built in outer space and never enter the earth's
atmosphere. These craft will function entirely in an outer space environment pro-
viding transport between extraterrestrial points. Michael L. Roberts, Address at
25th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium (Feb. 21, 1991).
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This practice has significantly increased circuitry in air
travel, thus lengthening flying time for many travelers. 58
The hub concentration resulting from entry and exit op-
portunities granted by deregulation has translated into es-
calating fares.59 Passengers beginning flights at a hub
airport pay as much as 50% more than if deregulation had
not occurred.6 °
If one of the lessons learned from deregulation is that
unregulated oligopolist or monopolist carriers will sacri-
fice direct, efficient routing of passengers between travel
points in order to increase overall profit, will similar
problems occur in space? If, as expressed above, hub and
spoking is likely to be an inherent characteristic of space-
lines, then perhaps the practice should not be completely
disposed of, but only regulated enough to avoid the
problems that stem from it. Areas of concern for space-
line regulation include allocation of limited terminal
space and scheduling of routes to avoid the other
problems of limited entry and monopoly power. 61
Regulation often includes a public policy objective as
well as an economic objective. Like economic goals, polit-
- Dempsey, supra note 17, at 352. Hubbing is a process whereby an airline op-
erates connecting banks of arriving an departing flights at certain airports. By
channeling passengers from many points through an intermediate connecting
point, or hub, a carrier can combine passengers with different origins and destina-
tions and thereby increase the number of city-pairs it serves (and the average
number of passengers and revenue per flight). DANIEL KASPER, DEREGULATION
AND GLOBALIZATION 30 (1988). This arrangement seems very efficient initially,
but the fallout effects are less positive. Now all major airlines have created hub-
and-spoke systems and all but four hub airports are dominated by a single airline.
This domination of the traffic and infrastructure continues to have devastating
effects on competition. Dempsey, supra note 17, at 330.
59 Dempsey, supra note 17, at 333.
ld.;see also Stockton, supra note 50, at 1; infra notes 159-60 and accompanying
text (discussion of the ramifications of deregulation on air fares).
- A grandfather system currently exists in the United States whereby terminal
space is allocated on a seniority basis. Will this work in space? Will it even be
necessary, considering the relatively low volume of arrivals and departures?
These are additional questions which will need to be addressed as the spaceline
system comes of age in conjunction with orbital space ports.
It should be noted that the grandfather system is not held in high favor by all
airline industry regulators. The thrust in Europe is toward phasing out this often
discriminatory practice of terminal allocation.
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ical and social goals sometimes cannot be met through a
purely free-market system because they conflict with busi-
nesses' goal of maximizing profits.62 In regulating an in-
dustry, the government should seek to achieve an
equitable balance between market efficiency and public
policy objectives. For example, prohibitions on rate dis-
crimination are usually necessary where the imperfect na-
ture of the competitive environment (i.e., limited terminal
facilities) makes it difficult for new competitors to enter
the market to stabilize prices.63 Safety policy concerns
often cannot be met through the market.64 Regulation
protects smaller competitors from predatory tactics of
larger, stronger companies. Thus, if economic efficiency
and political and social goals are to be maintained in the
spaceline industry, some form of regulation will probably
be desirable with these ends in mind. This will be the case
regardless of whether the market consists of many small
competitors or, as is perhaps more likely, of a few space-
line power players.
C. Lessons in Price, Quality, and Service
The limited and selective price decreases brought about
by deregulation have been accompanied by dramatic de-
creases in quality and service. Most price reductions have
taken the form of discount fares with time restrictions, ad-
vance purchase requirements, and non-refundability pro-
visions.6 5 Full fares rose 156% from 1978 to 1988, twice
the rate of growth of the Consumer Price Index over the
same period.66 Additionally, service quality declines in
the form of increased delays and schedule uncertainty at-
tributable to deregulation have added opportunity costs
to air travel as well as increased aggravation and anxiety.67
62 DEMPSEY, supra note 20, at 77 (quoting COL. STATE AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE
AUDIT OF THE PUB. UTIL. COMM'N 14-15 (1988)).
"'Id.
" See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
Dempsey, supra note 17, at 356.
' Id. at 357.
67 Id. at 357, 360.
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Along with service quality declines, unregulated airlines
often resort to bait-and-switch advertising, deliberate
overbooking, unrealistic scheduling, and demand-based
flight cancellations. 68 According to one explanation, de-
clines in profitability resulting from destructive competi-
tion have used up the resources airlines could have
otherwise used to enhance staffing, buy and maintain air-
craft, provide better food, and avoid overbooking.69 If
these ramifications are considered undesirable in the air-
line industry, they also deserve disdain from those plan-
ning to avoid foreseeable problems in the spaceline
industry.
Service to some destinations is insured by federal assist-
ance. The government subsidizes airlines to cover their
operational losses and provide a reasonable profit in or-
der to ensure service to otherwise unprofitable destina-
tions, usually small, low-traffic areas. 70 Not surprisingly,
deregulation has resulted in higher prices for poorer ser-
vice to small businesses and small towns. Many communi-
ties are losing their airline services, and many more have
seen a decrease in the frequency of direct flights in their
areas. Since deregulation, about 140 small towns have
lost all air service and 190 others have seen their large
airline service replaced by smaller, less comfortable, less
convenient and less safe commuter lines.7'
Perhaps these governmental subsidies will also be nec-
essary someday in intraspace transport if regular traffic
between points wholly outside the Earth's atmosphere
ever reaches a volume beyond which individual chartering
is sufficient. It is doubtful, however, that subsidized
routes to or from points on Earth will be necessary. This
is because, as stated above, other transportation methods
will be used to reach the hub launch sites on Earth.
' Id. at 371.
Id.
71 DEMPSEY, supra note 20, at 29. The payment of this compensation is author-
ized in 49 U.S.C. § 1389 (1988).
71 DEMPSEY, supra note 20, at 107.
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Therefore, this service problem of airlines which deregu-
lation has made even more important should not carry
over as an issue of space transport.
The costs of space travel and transport are currently
very high; thus, competitive pricing is not yet a real issue.
The cost of placing just one kilogram of payload into orbit
currently ranges from $5000 to $10,000.72 This high cost
deters space exploration and use, but scientists all over
the world are working to make space transport less expen-
sive.73 Private companies as well as governments are al-
ready involved in the development and use of commercial
launch vehicles to take payloads into space at competitive
prices. 74 Additionally, the development of air-space sys-
tems wherein a shuttle or similar craft can take off like an
airplane and continue into low earth orbit will likely be
the next major technological breakthrough.75 Some
scientists believe that these systems could transport com-
mercial travelers and cargo very quickly over great dis-
tances at costs which many would find acceptable.76
These scientists have set a goal of developing hypersonic
passenger and cargo transportation very early in the
twenty-first century.77 Whether the costs ever fall to a
level such that price competition can truly exist remains to
be seen, but as technology advances, price competition
may become an issue.
72 Lonzino-Lozinsky & Plokhikh, supra note 14, at 36.
7.3 Id.
74 Joseph A. Bosco, International Law Regarding Outer Space -An Overview, 55 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 609, 611 (1990) (citing generally, Art Dula, Private Sector Activities in
Outer Space, 19 Irr'L LAw. 159 (1985)).
75 See supra note 8.
M Lonzino-Lozinsky & Plokhikh, supra note 14, at 40. Lonzino-Lozinsky and
Plokhikh, two prominent Soviet space scientists, offer some figures for cost com-
parison: currently, the airfare for a subsonic flight from Moscow to Washington is
about $1,000. A supersonic Concorde flight from London to New York is $2,400.
The estimated cost per flight for a passenger on the Space Shuttle (assuming a
capacity of 70 passengers) is now about $2 million. The price of an air-space
ticket halfway around the world, such as from London to Hong Kong, would be
around $50,000. They believe that new technological developments could lower
these costs even more by the first decade of the 21st century. Id.
77 Id.
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It is safe to say that spacelines will not be economical
for everyday travel and transport in the same manner as
airlines for quite some time. Therefore, the applicability
of the lessons of airline deregulation (or just about any
experience in earthbound endeavors) will be limited. If
we assume, however, that price, quality, and service be-
come considerations at some optimal level, the questions
become: How are we to reach that level? Will the market-
place do it? What will be the important service and qual-
ity considerations? How can they be affected by
regulation?
We have learned from deregulation that unregulated
monopolies or oligopolies in the transportation industry
can reduce quality and service while holding up prices or
pricing discriminately because of limited access through
hubs. It has also been conceded that hubs will be neces-
sary as a practical matter for space travel. With these
premises as a foundation, those planning the future gov-
ernance of domestic and international space transport
must make basic policy decisions to either bolster the
quantity of routes and quality of service through subsidies
or regulation, or leave it to the same types of market
forces that exist in the deregulated airline industry.
D. Lessons in Safety
Immediately after the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
when the deregulation of the airline industry went into ef-
fect, competition in the industry dramatically increased,
resulting in net industry losses of $500 million in the six-
month period ending in March of 1980.78 That amounted
to the worst profitability in the industry's history.79 This
economic anemia has resulted in less safe air travel.80 The
lessons in safety stemming from airline regulation and de-
7m DEMPSEY, supra note 20, at 31.
710 Id.
No Dempsey, supra note 17, at 373-75; see also P. D. Dagtoglou, Air Transport and
the European Community, 6 EUR. L. REV. 335, 343 (1981); Ludwig Weber, Air Trans-
port in the Common Market and the Public Air Transport Enterprises, 5 ANNALS OF AIR &
SPACE L. 283, 299 (1980).
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regulation should be considered, as safety in space travel
is also of utmost importance.
Whenever profitability is suffering, it is natural for man-
agement to take measures to cut costs. In the airline in-
dustry, the costs that can be reduced most quickly and
significantly are maintenance costs closely connected with
safety: mechanics' wages,8" spare or replacement parts,
and idle vehicle time during inspection and mainte-
nance. 82 An increase in FAA maintenance fines appears
to reflect this tendency to reduce safety-related
expenditures.83
Since deregulation, the average age of the aircraft fleet
in the United States has increased markedly.84 Expendi-
tures relating to maintenance have declined, and the
number of near misses and accidents has increased. Addi-
tionally, hiring standards for cockpit crews have become
more lenient, and pilots are required to fly more hours
with less rest.85 In fact, 97% of airline pilots agree that
deregulation has resulted in decreased airline safety.8 6
In dealing with safety concerns, regulation is often su-
perior to judicially ordained tort damage awards. No mat-
ter how well money can erase the pain of injury, economic
compensation for injury frequently cannot restore health,
and can never restore life. In contrast, regulation at-
tempts to prevent injuries before they occur, thereby pro-
tecting the innocent from harm.87 Many who may be
harmed (including children and bystanders) are not "mar-
ket participants" and thus do not have the opportunity to
"purchase" their personally optimal amount of safety.88
,, Union protection is a limiting factor on an airline's ability to cut mechanics'
wages.
112 DEMPSEY, supra note 20, at 31.
84 Id.
84 Id. at 116.
"" Id.
" Id. at 78.
'7 Id.
" Notwithstanding this discussion, it should be noted that deregulation per se
did not involve lifting safety requirements. The United States government still
maintains control over the technical side of the airline industry, though the pric-
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Thus, what would normally work as deterrence through
the tort system may be less effective while regulation man-
dates safety standards applicable to all.
There is no doubt that NASA has learned in the last
decade at least two lessons: one, safety measures are of
the utmost importance when dealing with fragile, techni-
cal spacecraft; and two, even strict safety regulation can
break down and result in tragedy. Considering how
quasi-governmental regulation89 did not succeed in avoid-
ing the Challenger tragedy, would we be better off relying
on a deregulated market to supply the requisite safety?
Surely not. We have learned that deregulation resulting
in market competition at some level requires cost - and
corner-cutting. Essentially, NASA was cost - and corner-
cutting when it chose to give the Challenger mission the
green light while simultaneously recognizing that serious
safety considerations directed otherwise. 90 The easiest
cost-cutting measures are those that quickly affect the bot-
tom line while causing the least immediate disruption.
Safety should come first; in reality it goes first. This is un-
acceptable in space transport. The technical nature and
inherent danger in space transport need not be exacer-
bated by any incentive to forego necessary, indeed
greater-than-necessary, safety measures.
In the United States, airline safety regulation has been
maintained, even while pricing has been deregulated.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) function as the
ing side is left to the market. The National Transportation Safety Board and the
Federal Aviation Administration are the primary organizations performing this
safety checking measure. See Luebker, supra note 48, at 623.
-' The National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) is an agency of
the United States government; however, it is largely self-regulated. The political,
administrative, and technological forces impacting decision and rule-making in
the agency must bear some resemblance to the types of pressures any organiza-
tion or company would face in competition - whether against time (as in the
Apollo race to the moon) or against itself (as in the Challenger case) or against
other, profitable companies (as would be the case in a deregulated spaceline
market).
9o PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT, RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT 104 (June 6, 1986).
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overseers of technical safety considerations. Without
doubt, some form of safety regulation must exist domesti-
cally, and probably also internationally, if space transport
is to be a viable transportation option for passengers and
shippers. Presumably, the NTSB or the FAA could ex-
tend its role to include space transport in the United
States. As we have seen in the deregulated airline indus-
try, however, other forces can affect safety beyond what
these bodies can do (or have done). Because most of
these forces stem from competition for profits, the future
commercial space transport industry must be regulated in
a manner which considers the detrimental as well as the
beneficial aspects of competition. An unsafe spaceline in-
dustry is not an option.
E. Reregulation? The Lessons Considered
After learning some of these hard lessons, some com-
mentators are calling for reregulation of the airline indus-
try. The ideas they express may be useful in drawing
lessons from the deregulation experience and applying
them to space transport governance. Paul Stephen
Dempsey, a prominent advocate of airline reregulation,
offers several ideas to consider in reregulating the airline
industry.9 ' One proposal is that entry must be regulated
to prevent an unhealthy influx of capacity which jeopar-
dizes efficiency.92 Moreover, entry into the commercial
space transport industry should be regulated for a
number of reasons. Along with efficiency considerations,
safety and service quality are affected when too many or
below-standard suppliers of transportation service occupy
a market. Through regulatory "gate-keeping," efficiency
and economy can be maintained without sacrificing safety
or service quality.
A body in charge of enforcement of the regulations
should exercise power to suspend or revoke licenses to
m DEMPSEY, supra note 20, at 223-24.
92 Id.
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operate when a company fails to meet safety standards or
engages in discriminatory or predatory actions. 93 En-
forcement is a necessary companion to all regulation. On
a domestic level, this will not be very difficult to achieve.
Effective regulation requires an agency that will police the
space transport industry. By granting an agency power to
remove authorization to operate, standards of efficiency,
service, and safety can all be maintained. The real prob-
lem will be establishing such a power on an international
scale, if ever deemed desirable. Certainly, the depth and
breadth of the enforcement aspect requires consideration
if international regulation of the space transport industry
becomes a goal. 94
Another possibility for reregulation is establishment of
a "reasonable zone" method to govern rate structures. 95
Efficient, well-managed companies should be able to earn
a reasonable return on their investment. Establishment of
a zone within which price competition could exist might
avoid the problems of economy-induced safety declines
when prices fall very low, yet keep consumer prices below
some ordained level where forces push prices up. Until
technology reaches a point where costs, and thus prices,
achieve a higher degree of predictability and stability, it
seems that establishment of a "reasonable zone" would
be very difficult. Eventually, however, such a rate struc-
turing system may be viable for the space transport
industry.
Mergers and acquisitions should be carefully scruti-
nized, but agreements enhancing efficiency, encouraging
information flows, and facilitating ratemaking principles
should be granted antitrust immunity.96 This proposal is
revolutionary, indeed. The possibilities of both collusion
as well as deleterious competition loom large when one
I" /d.
See infra notes 139-175 and accompanying text for a discussion of possible
regulatory and enforcement methods.
', DEMPSEY, supra note 20, at 223-24.
I ld. at 224.
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considers the effects of granting antitrust immunity to an
industry that already has such few, huge oligopolistic and
monopolistic participants. The applicability of this idea to
space transport will depend on the structure into which
the industry evolves. Obviously, mergers and acquisitions
in the airline industry have had great impact since reregu-
lation. If the government chooses to keep a tight rein on
the space transport industry and guide and mold its devel-
opment, mergers and acquisitions of industry participants
should be reviewed in some manner. This would facilitate
the structuring of a strong industry while maintaining
control over what is sure to become a big business. The
real problem as mentioned above will be carrying such
control into the international arena.97
III. INTERNATIONAL AIR GOVERNANCE AND THE EFFECTS
OF DEREGULATION
The international consequences of United States dereg-
ulation appear to be more positive than the domestic ef-
fects, at least for the moment. United States airlines
occupy strengthened positions relative to foreign airlines,
and European carriers are attempting to offset those ad-
vantages through mergers and establishment of comput-
,7 In another writing, Dempsey advocates reform of the regulatory system to
"steer a common sense course between heavy-handed regulation and laissez-
faire." Dempsey, supra note 17, at 307. His recommendations include the follow-
ing four points:
-Establishment of a new body to regulate the transportation indus-
tries with a broad perspective of all transportation systems and
which is "immune from capture by any single transport industry."
-"[P]rohibition of a single airline maintaining a dominant position at
more than a single airport;"
-"[P]rice regulation directed at keeping fares within a range which
would prohibit price-gouging in thin markets on the one hand, and
predatory pricing to drive out new competitors on the other;"
-Regulations "directed at eliminating price discrimination, so that
fare differences reflect cost differences and not differential market
power.
Id. at 307-08.
These points offer additional considerations for viewing both possible reregula-
tion of the airline industry and future governance of the space transport industry.
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erized reservations systems. 98 Foreign governments are
also beginning to press the United States to open its do-
mestic market.99
One expert argues that by the turn of the century most
of the world's air transport services will be provided by
large multinational airlines competing on a worldwide
scale. 00 If this turns out to be the case, perhaps it offers
something to an analysis of the possible effects of a rela-
tively unregulated space transport industry. The exist-
ence of a few, large multinational airlines is a natural
result of several factors. For instance, United States air-
line deregulation has brought about more competition
and major structural changes in the industry and foreign
airlines and governments have had to react by accepting
more market liberalization than they would have other-
wise.0" Since United States deregulation, Canada, New
Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the
People's Republic of China have significantly deregulated
their domestic air service markets. 0 2 Additionally, many
of those nations with state-owned airlines are considering
privatization.10 3 Whether the international space trans-
port industry will be substantially privatized or govern-
ment-run is as of yet unknown, but if the market consists
of both types of participants (as the current airline indus-
try does), the relationships between these competitors
may analogize to those in the airline market.
Today, bilateral agreements are the basis for interna-
tional air service operations. 04 Airlines have no right to
engage in traffic to, from, or over a nation's territory with-
out the consent of the sovereign state.10 5 Thus, these bi-
" KASPER, supra note 58, at 41-42.
Id. at 42.
"" Id. at 1.
10l Id.
12 Id.
-.1 Id. The following airlines have either been privatized already or are being
seriously considered as candidates for privitization: British Airways, Japan Air
Lines, Air Canada, Air France, and Lufthansa. Id. at 9.
i " Id.
""' IRVIN L. WHITE, DECISION-MAKING FOR SPACE: LAW AND POLITICS IN AIR, SEA
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lateral agreements, governing entry, capacity, traffic, fares
and routes are negotiated between national governments
whose airlines want to provide service in another
country. 06
The legal and institutional regime governing interna-
tional air services developed during the late 194 0s. The
international system we have today "arose from the fail-
ure of nations to agree on a more comprehensive, multi-
lateral system.' 0 7 Thus, air services have developed
under an odd array of multilateral and bilateral agree-
ments entered into by both governments and airlines. 08
It is likely that space services will develop in much the
same manner.
Among governments, multilateral agreements generally
address international legal issues affecting the operation
of civil aircraft. 0 9 These matters include overflight rights,
nationality of aircraft, and minimum safety, maintenance,
and training standards." 0 In contrast, bilateral agree-
ments usually deal with the exchange of substantive eco-
nomic rights."' Some technical safety and security
matters are addressed through bilateral agreements, as
are ancillary issues like conversion of currency, repatria-
tion of profits, and mutual recognition of licenses.' 12
Among airlines, multilateral agreements deal with a
number of technical and facilitation matters, trade associ-
ation activities, and pricing agreements.' '3 Bilateral
agreements sometimes address issues involving division
AND OUTER SPACE 197 (1971), excerpted in GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P.
MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 36 (1989).
1- KASPER, supra note 58, at 3.






". Id. For further discussion of bilateral air service agreements, see id. at 50-57
(discussing economic rights which includes entry and designation, capacity, route
and traffic rights, pricing; and ancillary rights which consist of local currency con-
versions, profit repatriation, access to local distribution channels, etc.).
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of capacity or traffic, pricing, reciprocal access to reserva-
tions systems, maintenance, ground handling, and joint
operations. 1 4
This system of contracting for rights and duties thus
makes up a large part of what constitutes aviation law.
Because most international relationships are governed by
treaties, a system of international space transport regula-
tion must arise, at least initially, in the same manner.
IV. CURRENT SPACE LAW
The Space Age has developed incredibly quickly in just
over three decades." 5 What is almost as amazing is that
space law has preceded this rapid technological develop-
ment in many aspects. Rather than following technical
developments and creating rules and regulations long af-
ter international customs and practices have been estab-
lished, space law has provided an early framework for the
planning and carrying out of activities regarding the ex-
ploration and use of outer space." t6
Several nations have cooperated to form and adopt
agreements on the general principles of outer space re-
lated activities. These agreements are manifested mostly
in multilateral treaties and enunciate broad principles
which form the groundwork for further development of
specific regulations and rules as they become relevant.'
The policies underlying the direction of space use and,
therefore, space law are currently found in the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo-
ration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)."l 8 This doc-
114Id.
1 The opening of the Space Age is generally credited to the launch of the first
man-made satellite, Sputnik 1, into low earth orbit by the U.S.S.R. in October,
1957.
1- Peter Jankowitsch, Foreward to MORRis FORKOSCH, OUTER SPACE AND LEGAL
LIABILITY at xiv (1982).
,,7 Bosco, supra note 75, at 612.
- opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinaf-
ter Outer Space Treaty].
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ument represents an international effort at cooperation
regarding the exploration and use of outer space. It sets
forth ideals and principles relating to peaceful coexistence
and progress in the development of space and is the basic
treaty out of which all other space treaties developed. t9
The treaty states in article II: "Outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to na-
tional appropriation by claim, by sovereignty, by means of
use or occupation, or by any other means."'' 20 This prin-
ciple highlights an inherent difference between regulating
outer space activities and regulating airlines. According
to well-established civil aviation law dating back to the
Chicago Convention of 1944, each nation has sovereign
power and control over the airspace directly above it.' 2'
Although defining the separation of air space and outer
space is itself a difficult issue, 22 the Outer Space Treaty
announces that outer space above a nation is open to de-
velopment and use by all nations. Regulation of this area,
therefore, is not the responsibility or province of any na-
tion, but of all nations cooperatively. 2 3 Thus, while do-
mestic regulation of the space transport industry is in
order, it is also obvious that the international interaction
in outer space will demand cooperative regulations as
'" MARIETrA BENKO ET AL., SPACE LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS 162 (1985).
12(l Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. II, 18 U.S.T. at 2412, 610 U.N.T.S.
at 708.
121 Convention On International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. Article 1 states: "The con-
tracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace above its territory." Id. art. 1, 61 Stat. at 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. at
296. Article 2 further declares: "For the purposes of this convention the territory
of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent
thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection, or mandate of such State."
Id. art. 2, 61 Stat. at 1181, 15 U.N.T.S. at 298.
"'12 This is known as the "delimitation" issue. See BENKO, supra note 120, at
121-30.
121 See infra notes 144-151 and accompanying text. Note also that this "province
of all mankind" approach to space is similar to international maritime law on the
High Seas and aviation law over the oceans. The reason this characteristic of in-
ternational law exists and is accepted by all nations is undoubtedly to protect and
enhance economic interests. Apparently the same approach is being taken to
space law for the same reasons. See WHITE, supra note 106, at 36.
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well. The eventual form of this regulation (whether solely
by bilateral and multilateral treaties or by a central gov-
erning body) remains undecided, but this treaty at least
recognizes the necessity of international cooperation.
Article III addresses this idea directly and asserts that
nations shall use outer space "in accordance with interna-
tional law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in
the interest of maintaining international peace and secur-
ity and promoting international co-operation and under-
standing."' 24  As commercial and governmental space
traffic increases, however, the international cooperation
so obviously essential to maintaining peaceful govern-
ment of space will become both more important and more
difficult to achieve. We should incorporate the lessons
from our experiences with the international consequences
of deregulation as well as our experiences with interna-
tional air and maritime law into the formula we finally set
to govern space transport. 25 At this time, air transport
law is the closest useful analogy available to aid us in mak-
ing international cooperation in the coming "spaceline"
industry a realistic goal.
Article VI states that nations agreeing to the Outer
Space Treaty 26 carry a responsibility to all nations for
their activities in outer space, regardless of whether the
expedition is governmental or commercial in nature. 27
'2 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. III, 18 U.S.T. at 2413, 610 U.N.T.S.
at 208.
"2 See infra note 129.
12, Eighty-eight nations have agreed to be bound by this document. (Eighty-
nine before the unification of Germany and at December 31, 1988.)
127 Outer Space Treaty, art. VI, supra note 119, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, 610 U.N.T.S.
at 209. The actual language, revealing a significant principle of current (and most
likely future) outer space governance is as follows:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for
national activities in outer space ... whether such activities are car-
ried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities,
and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity
with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of
non-governmental entities in outer space ... shall require authoriza-
tion and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the
Treaty.
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Each nation is therefore responsible for the actions of any
and all civilian space users and is required to authorize
and supervise any such activity. 28
In accordance with the principles of responsibility in ar-
ticle VI, article VII places liability for damage caused to
another State Party on the State Party which either
launches, procures the launching, or from whose territory
or facility such object is launched. 2 9 Thus, as it stands,
the nation "responsible" for the damage caused by either
government or private spacecraft shall be held liable since
it is that nation's responsibility to police the space-related
actions of all its constituents.130
In support of this governing power, article VIII states
that jurisdiction over and ownership of objects launched
into outer space remain with the State Party who carries
the particular spacecraft or other object on its registry.' 3 '
This principle offers further enforcement authority to sov-
ereign nations in international space and affords some de-
gree of extended protection over its constituents'
activities.
The interaction of nations in space and the possible
conflicts of multiple nations in space are dealt with in arti-
cle IX. 132  This article requires any nation either con-
12- This practice is similar to maritime and aviation law. Ships and planes are
assigned nationality so that in the absence of any general international enforce-
ment agency, assigning responsibility to the flag state for liability and safety mat-
ters affords some enforcement basis. WHITE, supra note 106, at 36-37.
12.. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. VII, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, 610
U.N.T.S. at 209.
1." The possibilities for liability in space transport are legion. Damages could
arise from falling spacecraft, collisions with other spacecraft or space stations, pol-
lution, and just about any other errant activity that could be envisioned in air
transport activities.
'1' Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. VIII, 18 U.S.T. at 2416, 610
U.N.T.S. at 209.
,32 Id. art. IX, 18 U.S.T. at 2416-17, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209-10. The text of the
article states:
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or
experiment [perhaps read "commercial or governmental space
flight"] planned by it or its nationals in outer space.., would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties
in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space ... it shall under-
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ducting space-related activities or knowing of such activity
planned by another to actively seek out communication to
resolve any potential conflict arising from the conduct. 33
This provision is actually a primitive form of "space traffic
control." This article sets the stage for both bilateral and
multilateral agreements to establish relative rights of use
and maintain cooperation, much like in current interna-
tional air space governance. 134
Article XI provides that State parties to the Agreement
will "inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations
as well as the public and the international scientific com-
munity, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of
the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activi-
ties." 35 While this may become either unnecessary or im-
practical as space traffic increases, this language indicates
that disclosure of information such as flight plans, desti-
nations, and purposes of space traffic and use should be
routed through a central dissemination point whereby the
previously discussed multinational space traffic conflicts
can be more efficiently handled.136
take appropriate international consultations before proceeding with
any such activity or experiment. [Also, where a State Party to the
Treaty] has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned
by another State Party in outer space . . . would cause potentially
harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and
use of outer space ... [it] may request consultation concerning the
activity or experiment.
Id. The language appears to authorize multinational cooperative regulation of
space traffic and space use. It also appears that such regulation almost certainly
would be organized, enunciated, and implemented through treaties. Article X
further encourages space flight observation between States to be governed by
agreement between the concerned States. Id. art. X, 18 U.S.T. at 2417, 610
U.N.T.S. at 210.
'".. Outer Space Treaty art. IX, supra note 119, art. IX, 18 U.S.T. at 2416-17,
610 U.N.T.S. at 209-10.
1.4 For a discussion of some problems of establishing zones for traffic control of
low earth orbital craft, see Patrick Q. Collins, Legal Consideration for Traffic Sys-
tems in Near-Earth Space, Address Before the International Institute of Space
Law of the International Astronautical Federation (Oct. 11-15, 1989), in 1989
PROC. THIRTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 296-303.
,- Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. XI, 18 U.S.T. at 2418, 610 U.N.T.S.
at 210. Presumably, this provision applies to all activities in space exploration and
use, including both scientific and commercial activities.
1- See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
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Article XIII also provides for governance of "[a]ny
practical questions arising in connection with activities" in
outer space and under certain circumstances by either
"the appropriate international organization or with one
or more State members of that international organization,
which are Parties to this Treaty."'' 37 This provision per-
haps clears the way for the establishment of an interna-
tional regulatory body to perform administrative
functions regarding the space transport industry. This
would certainly be an alternative to governance by trea-
ties. Many problems would accompany the establishment
of a general, central governing system to regulate space
activities. Some aspects of space exploration and use,
however, might lend themselves to limited centralized
regulation. Areas such as safety and traffic control would
probably be the initial possibilities.
V. APPLICATION OF THE PAST IN AIR LAW TO THE
FUTURE IN SPACE TRANSPORT
The Space Age has already brought about new legal
and regulatory measures to deal with the issues of space
exploration and use. 38 Access to outer space and the es-
tablishment of an orderly and safe environment to con-
duct space activities requires considerable regulation.13 9
The regulatory system will require both domestic and in-
ternational measures. 40 The international regulation will
include bilateral and multilateral agreements on both re-
gional and global scales.' 4' As the high costs and risks of
17 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. XIII 18 U.S.T. at 2418-19, 610
U.N.T.S. at 211.
,-4 For a discussion of the many subjects of current treaties and other law on
outer space and emerging topics for future agreements, see Harry H. Almond, Jr.,
The Emerging Framework Of International Law for Outer Space: The Treaties
and International Agreements, Address Before the International Institute of
Space Law of the International Astronautical Federation, (Oct. 11-15, 1981), in
1989 PROC. OF THE THIRTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM L. OF OUTER SPACE, 273-80.
'- Bosco, supra note 75, at 611.
1" Id. at 611-12.
14 YOUNG, supra note 4, at 5. According to Young, man's entry into space on a
regular basis:
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space activities become more apparent, cooperation in the
field of space exploration may tend toward a global per-
spective. Some ideas for development of global space
governance have included United Nations control, a
Space Court, and a World Space Organization. Regard-
less of the form, as commercialization of space becomes
more of a reality and cooperation becomes a necessity
(due to the nature of space as the "province of all man-
kind"), the application of lessons of aviation law as well as
our experience with deregulation will help make the space
law regulation system more effective.
The effectiveness of the system will have great impact
on our ability to use space to its full potential, but regard-
less of the manner of development, space transport is sure
to experience exponential growth in the future. Will the
system grow by each nation regulating its own transport
systems independently, or by international regulation?
The answer will depend on whether technologically ad-
vanced nations believe it is in their best interests to work
out internationally agreed upon standards and systems. 42
A. Cooperation?
The tendency of both current space law and current ac-
tivity in space is toward international cooperation. 43 If
this cooperation is a reflection of the desires of nations
which have been archenemies for decades to work side by
side to advance the use of space, it is quite commendable.
will inevitably and irrevocably precipitate a host of legal and regula-
tory measures. These will be promulgated at all legislative levels,
both municipal and international, the latter including bilateral, re-
gional and global. They will be both responsive to and anticipatory
of technological developments, according to the context and the op-
erative legislative philosophy .... [T]his process has already begun
and will be illustrated by a multi-tiered progression from the na-
tional, through the bilateral and multilateral, to the global.
Id. (in the context of space stations).
1' Hamilton DeSaussure, Maritime and Space Law, Comparisons and Contrasts (An
Oceanic View of Space Transport), 9 J. SPACE L. 93, 93 (1981) excerpted in GLENN H.
REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 28-
29 (1989).
143 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
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Certainly these actions are being taken by nations because
they are in each respective nation's best interest rather
than simply due to some newfound global goodwill. Just
as there are economies of scale in the transportation in-
dustry, so too economies of scale are found in many ways
when international cooperation exists in space explora-
tion and use. The synergy of international interaction
brings rewards to all of mankind. As indicated earlier,
however, one of the greatest weights burdening the devel-
opment of space law is the seeming incongruity between
the nationalistic motivation that has inspired the success-
ful exploitation of our world on Earth and this competing
desire to approach the use of space from a "universal
good" perspective.' 44 Some suggest that real break-
throughs in space exploration and utilization will only be
achieved when the motivation flows from selfish, competi-
tive acquisitiveness, generally from a nationalistic
perspective. 145
Would international regulation of the space transport
industry necessarily stifle the aggressive ingenuity that fu-
els great advances in space exploration and development?
Could a system of regulation ever foster this capitalistic
attitude? Answers to these questions may signal the ulti-
mate success or failure of our cooperative attempts to es-
tablish an international structure for space development.
Currently, six powers have the capability to launch a
mission to outer space: the United States, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the European Space Agency
(ESA) nations, 146 Japan, the People's Republic of China,
144 YOUNG, supra note 4, at 6. According to Young:
[A central problem of developing space law is the] tension between
the desire to perpetuate the rationales which have motivated man-
kind in his successful exploitation of the Earth, and the equally
strong belief in the radical "Province of all Mankind" concept. ...
It may well be that the space frontier cannot be opened up without
the spirit which has brought us to this threshold, with all its national-
istic acquisitiveness, being given a free rein.
Id.
I4 d.
The European Space Agency (ESA) is the space development counterpart to
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and India. 147 A number of other nations are prominently
involved with space activities in cooperation with at least
one of the six launch powers. 48
Although the superpowers have always used space
travel and exploration as propaganda devices, prompting
continued competition and political "one-upmanship,"
the trend is moving toward more cooperation in space
use.' 49 The ultimate, utopian goal would be to create a
climate in which the use of space assets is divorced from
and unaffected by terrestrial political concerns.' 5 ° While
the airline industry is not entirely divorced from politics,
it is more so than the space industry. Perhaps the fact that
the airline industry is so commercialized makes this partial
separation possible. Obviously, national carrier airlines
are not free from political forces, but as the trend contin-
ues toward privatization,' 5 the separation will widen.
Would privatization of the space industry increase or de-
crease cooperation? As long as governments are in-
volved, so are politics. It is unlikely that total
privatization will ever be desirable in the space transport
industry, thus, this issue may be moot.
Today, many roadblocks stand in the way of coopera-
tion free from earthly political conflicts, but there has
been considerable progress in recent years (though not
the European Economic Community (EEC). While the membership in the two
organizations is not exactly the same, there is considerable overlap. The Member
States in the ESA are: France, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, The Nether-
lands, Norway and Austria. Finland is an Associate member and Canada has a
"special" relationship agreement with ESA. Id. at 40.
147 Id. at 292.
'14 Id. Canada is involved with both the U.S. and the ESA in substantial space
activity. The U.S. Space Shuttle has flown payload specialists from the ESA,
France, Saudi Arabia, and Mexico. The Challenger accident suspended this pro-
gram before completion of plans which included representatives from the U.K.,
Japan, Australia, and the People's Republic of China. The Soviet Union has car-
ried into space representatives from Czechoslovakia, Poland, the (then) German
Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia, and
Romania. Id. at 292-93.
149 Id. at 293.
IN, See id.
'' See Luebker, supra note 48, at 590.
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wholly free from propaganda).2 Considering all of the
national and international forces affecting the direction of
space development, it seems that the positive effects of
both rivalry and cooperation should ideally be incorpo-
rated into the system that is eventually developed. The
governance structure should aim to achieve the best of
both worlds. The only way history has shown this can be
accomplished is through some form of international regu-
lation with freedoms within certain spheres of conduct.
The chances of achieving this ideal regulatory balance will
be enhanced if we apply the lessons of airline regulation
and deregulation.
B. Applying the Lessons
ECONOMIC AND PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY: As noted above,
the transportation industry is inherently susceptible to
price wars and excess capacity because of the immediately
vanishing utility when a craft takes off with an empty seat
or cargo compartment. 53 The incentive is to price high
early and hold "fire sales" on capacity remaining shortly
before takeoff. 5 4 As long as excess capacity exists, as it
may one day in the space context, transportation provid-
ers will seek out or create monopoly market opportuni-
ties. This brings on many of the problems discussed
herein resulting from deregulation. Space transportation
will be subject to many of the same pressures. How the
'2 YOUNG, supra note 4, at 293-94. For example, Interkosmos (USSR), NASA,
ESA and the Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science (ISAS) of Japan have
come together to establish the Inter-Agency Consultative Group (IACG) to con-
duct international cooperative projects. Among these are the successful missions
in 1986 to view Halley's Comet. The British National Space Centre has entered
pacts with the Soviet Institute of Space Sciences. The French and the Soviets are
cooperating to perform experiments on the MIR space station. The Chinese and
Japanese are even cooperating in the launching of small commercial and scientific
satellites. The Chinese and British are working together on a joint satellite design
and launch program. Negotiations are proceeding in an unprecedented coopera-
tive venture known as the U.S./International Space Station. Id. at 294-95.
"I See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
,.4 Dempsey, supra note 17, at 323.
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airlines deal with these problems should offer lessons for
application to the space transport industry.
At first, and perhaps permanently, depending upon
technological advances, only a few spaceports will be
built. As long as terminal space is scarce, the same
problems regarding allocation of terminal space may also
provide incentive for mergers aimed at creating monopoly
opportunities or acquiring more terminal access. This has
been seen in the airlines industry through the domination
of terminal space in the "fortress hubs."'' 55 The "fortress
hub" can be analogized to the space stations in low Earth
orbit. It will be expensive to get to the hub, but after that,
transportation between destinations in space will compare
closely to the airline industry. 56 Thus, the lessons of air-
line deregulation should apply well to an intraspace trans-
port system. The same issues of hub port capture
resulting from lack of terminal space must be dealt with to
avoid the problems seen in the airline context. 5 7
PRICE, QUALITY, AND SERVICE: It is probably safe to say
that spacelines will not be economical for everyday travel
and transport in the same manner as airlines.' 58 There-
fore, the applicability of the lessons of airline deregula-
tion (or just about any experience in earthbound
endeavors) will be limited. If one can assume, however,
that price, quality, and service become considerations at
some optimal level, the question becomes how can those
goals be met? Will the marketplace do it? What will be
the important service and quality considerations? How
can they be affected by regulation?
Deregulation has shown that unregulated monopolies
or oligopolies in the transportation industry can reduce
quality and service while holding up prices or furthering
discriminatory pricing because of limited access through
'.- Kasper, supra note 58, at 6.
1 1 Even today, Europeans view airline travel as somewhat of a luxury. Luebker,
supra note 48, at 590.
' ' See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
" See YOUNG, supra note 4, at 36.
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hubs. It has also been conceded that hubs will be neces-
sary as a practical matter for space travel.' 59 Transposing
the issue to space transport, the problems of* terminal ac-
cess, monopolies by merger aimed at overcoming the ac-
cess problem, and price competition to the extent it
becomes destructive to the structure of the system as a
whole must accordingly be addressed.
SAFETY CONCERNS: The importance of strict safety
measures in the space transport arena has been illustrated
all too vividly in the Challenger tragedy. As passenger
space flight becomes more common, the safety concerns
will only increase. After deregulation of the airline indus-
try, the immediate competition brought about some seri-
ous belt-tightening as a matter of survival. 160 By reducing
maintenance and other costs having a direct relation to
safety, some airlines were able to quickly add to their bot-
tom line while causing little immediate flight disruption.
This type of action is undesirable in air transport and un-
acceptable in space transport. Because the margin for er-
ror is so much smaller in the space context, both
incentives in the system and direct safety regulation are
imperative in order to maintain an optimal safety level.
All of these lessons must be packaged in a workable
form of governance. Assuming that some form of interna-
tional cooperative regulation should eventually be in the
best interest of all involved, the focus then concerns the
practicality of regulating the spaceline industry.
C. Practical Regulation
The negotiations regarding the U.S./International
space station were historically conducted using bilateral
agreements but have recently been transformed into lim-
ited multilateral arrangements.' 6' This progression
roughly parallels the agreements entered into between
See id. at 295.
See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
YOUNG, supra note 4, at 295.
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nations regarding air rights. 162 Some progress has been
achieved in U.N. committees such as the Committee on
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the Confer-
ence on Disarmament (CD), but after the many com-
promises necessary to pass such a body, the
pronouncements tend to be largely ineffective at solving
real problems. 163
National, bilateral, and multilateral attempts to deal
with space-related problems have reached pragmatic solu-
tions to the issues as they have surfaced. These develop-
ments in space law are occurring as needed in the absence
of effective global legislation. 164 State practices will lead
to international law based on custom, or piecemeal multi-
level legislative action will ensue.165 This is in fact already
occurring. One commentator suggests that this does not
necessarily need to be considered as veiled imperialism or
colonialism, but may be viewed as a maturation of space
law, paralleling similar developments in maritime and air
law. 166 What he believes "must be avoided is the cumula-
tive legislative reinforcement of the terrestrial status quo
in the 'province of all mankind', doing by collateral means
what could not be done openly at the global level."' 167
In the spirit of cooperation, many have advanced the
idea of a World Space Organization to advance the princi-
ples of peace and mutual advantage in the international
space use context. 168 Many experts understand this to be
more of a "universalist's pipedream" than a realistic goal,
I12 Id.
I- Id.
" A good example of the progression and development of the use of bilateral
and multilateral arrangements in the context of air law can be found in the Euro-
pean Community experience. As the countries of Europe move toward interna-
tional cooperation in their airline industry, and as barriers between the sovereign
nations are lifted, unique problems arise regarding the relationship of various
agreements governing air rights. The manner in which the conflicts are solved
should provide guidance in approaching the same types of issues regarding space
transport law. See Luebker, supra note 48, at 602-05.
'-5 YOUNG, supra note 4, at 295.
16 Id.
167 Id.
1- Id. at 296.
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however. 69 Most experts would probably agree, none-
theless, that developing countries as well as current space
powers should be brought into space participation, and
regulation should take this into account. The reason for
such inclusion is obvious if one subscribes to the view of
space as the province of all mankind. 70
Space law should be allowed to develop by national and
private international means, with much discretion given to
nations to operate in space except where their actions may
have detrimental effects on other nations' use of space.' 7 1
This situation is considered in article IX of the Outer
Space Treaty:
Global institutions should function to ameliorate the indi-
vidual excesses of nations operating in space through
timely and appropriate legislation. As a quid pro quo for
acceptance of such legislation, commercialization should
be allowed to proceed responsibly, with a public commit-
ment by the space powers to increasing pragmatic partici-
pation by developing nations as it unfolds. 7 2
An international Outer Space Court has also been con-
sidered by some to be a more realistic way to develop
space law and relations among space powers. 7 3 Because
the effectiveness of global legislation through such bodies
as the United Nations is inherently diluted through nu-
merous compromises, some finality and enforceability of
the provisions may be lost. The Outer Space Court has
been proposed to initially take on legislative as well as ju-
dicial responsibilities and then to give up the legislative
aspect after a reasonable time. 174 As with any judicial sys-
tem, problems could arise if the distinction between the
power to interpret law and the power to create law becomes
blurred.
-1. Id. at 296-97.
.... Id. at 297-98.
,7, Id. at 298-99.
172 Id.
171 See MORRIS FORKOSCH, OUTER SPACE AND LEGAL LIABILITY 4-5, 121-189
(1982).
,74 Id. at 15.
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If such a legislative-judicial body is deemed to be the
proper agency to direct the exploration and development
of space, what would be the effect on space transport reg-
ulation? Almost certainly, it seems that an Outer Space
Court would not have the capacity to deal with the grand
scheme as well as function as a truly legislative body.
Regulation of outer space activities would still be required
and there is almost no possibility that nations would be
willing to give up a more representative form of govern-
ance in order to achieve the "finality" a judicial body may
provide. Therefore, it seems that cumbersome, vague
regulation of outer space activities can only be dealt with
by continuing the scheme of bilateral and multilateral ar-
rangements. Ajudicial body may prove valuable on broad
issues of safety and liability, but the growth of the space
transport industry appears to hinge on the nations' ability
to cooperate in treaty and legislative form. Deregulation
of the airline industry and the lessons learned, therefore,
must not be ignored.
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